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Abstract 
 
If the scholarly self is irretrievably tied to the world, then self-situating is a fruitful source of 
data production. The researcher becomes a producer, as opposed to a collector, of data. This 
how-to paper identifies three analytical stages where such self-situating takes place. Pre-field; 
there is autobiographical situating; in-field, there is field situating, and post-field, there is 
textual situating. Each of these stages are presented in terms of the three literatures that have 
done the most work on them -- feminism, Gestalt, and poststructuralism – and a number of 
how-to examples. We illustrate with a number of how-to examples. In conclusion, we discuss 
how two different methodological commitments to situatedness, which Jackson (2010) 
dubbed reflexivist and analyticist, give rise to two analytically distinct ways of using the 
scholarly self for data production. Reflexivists and analyticists approach data production from 
opposite ends of the researcher/informant relationship. Where a reflexivist researcher tends to 
handle the relation between interlocutor and researcher by asking how interlocutors affect her, 
an analyticist researcher tends to ask how the researcher affects them. 
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Introduction 
This is first and foremost a how-to paper on method. We ask how researchers may situate 
themselves for their data production to be maximally effective. Situs is Latin for ‘site’, a place 
where something happens. The English expression ‘you must understand my situation’ moves 
the attention away from place, towards how a certain individual is related to place. Being 
situated means being mindful or aware of the relationship between oneself and one’s context. 
We argue that, since research is intersubjective, and since it is the researcher who initiates and 
takes charge of the research process in order to produce as reliable data as possible,  the more 
the researcher knows about why she has chosen to attempt data production about phenomenon 
X rather than Y, how she goes about producing that data and how she produces her stories 
about X, the better data, and the better texts. We draw on extant scholarship and identify three 
analytical stages that demand different kinds of situatedness. Stage one is pre-data production 
and concerns how the scholarly self came to pick the research issues and theories that resulted 
in this and that research question and not others. Stage two concerns data production: how 
does the scholarly self shape the context (reading, interview, fieldwork) in which data are 
produced? Stage three concerns textual production: how does the scholar document the pre-
production and production of data in the resulting scholarly work? In conclusion, we leave the 
how-to mode and look at how data collection or method is underpinned by what Jackson 
(2010) calls ontological wagers, that is, what the world is taken to consist of. . Analytical and 
reflectivist approaches share an ontological wager on monism; they see the social world as 
being forever in flux, and the researcher as a part of that world. They are divided on 
transfactualism. A reflexivist (such as Cecilie) takes social structures as transfactually given. 
This means that the focus is on the reflexivist herself, understood as a product of that 
structure, and that the scholarly work concerns how structures create the emergent scholarly 
self. By contrast, an analyticist (such as Iver), while acknowledging that the researcher' value 
commitments are changeable, goes for an approach where an (invariably value-based) model 
of the social is at the heart of the research process. The analyticist's focus is on how 
phenomena may be captured by means of that model. This means that the focus is on what 
other people do, and that the work concerns how that doing may be analyzed by means of the 
model.  
 
Why should we care about situatedness? If the scholarly self is producing the data, then the 
more knowledge about how this process proceeds the scholar has, the less random the data 
production and the better the data. In the social sciences, data production or method  is an 
intersubjective process; it involves direct or indirect interaction with other people. Data means 
factual knowledge about a certain phenomenon, be that an event or a state. When we speak of 
first-hand data, what we mean is that the researcher first asks some kind of question and then 
reads texts by eyewitnesses and participants, interviews persons, observes interactions or 
distributes questionnaires with a view to answering that question. The question is typically 
wide at first – what happens in this location? – only to become narrower -- why is it that the 
Xs keep on doing Y?  
 
Data production goes hand in hand with another kind of production, namely the production of 
text. Social scientists are supposed to have a number of skills, such as leading seminars, doing 
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presentations and put their knowledge to use in non-scientific contexts, but what makes them 
scientists is that they possess the knowledge to ask questions, know how to apply those 
questions to social sequences so that data may be produced and are able to use those data in 
order to tell a story about a social phenomenon. Those stories must be related to extant 
scientific stories about the same phenomenon, at a minimum within the same discipline, 
preferably within the social sciences, ideally within science in general. 
 
If, as both reflexivists and analyticists argue, the scholarly self is irretrievably tied to the 
world, there is no Archimedian point from which to size up the social. Knowledge is situated 
knowledge (Berger and Luckmann 1966, Smith 1974, Haraway 1988, Harding 1991, 
Bourdieu and Waquant 1992).
2
 Humans are fundamentally relational and always already 
socially situated. What was at stake for feminists and constructivists was that objective 
knowledge in the positivist sense of the term is not possible to obtain. This line of argument 
was followed by the realization that the individual subject is not one unified entity, but 
consists of a fragmented, developing set of identities. We take these as givens, and 
concentrate on more specific questions, like what parts of the scholars previous experiences 
that are relevant for the choice and conduct of research projects. The reason is that so many of 
our colleagues treat the minutia of situatedness, or indeed of many method, as obvious, small 
fry, beneath their dignity. The result of such neglect may easily be suboptimal data production 
and non-situated books and articles..     
 
Before we go to it, we should perhaps nonetheless take note of half a century’s worth of 
attacks on the idea of situated knowledge for eschewing the objectivist ideals and leading to a 
degeneration of social science into the pit of subjectivism (see Hamati-Ataya 2014 for a 
generous overview). The researcher acts as a self-aware modest witness (Haraway 1988). It is 
helpful for the scholar to reflect on where that gaze comes from and what it does and does not 
catch, and it is helpful for readers who want to evaluate the findings to know something about 
the origins of the scholarly gaze that engendered the research.  
 
Three phases and three literatures 
 
The temporality of the research process is circular. There is a recursive element to it. The data 
produced lead to a reformulation of the questions that initiated the production process, and the 
text produced forces a certain pattern in the produced data that often create new questions that 
have to be answered by new data production. The introduction is always the last thing to be 
written. Circularity notwithstanding, the very way we laid out the circularity is based on there 
being three more or less distinct phases to the process, that we address separately for 
analytical reasons. There is the planning or pre-field phase when phenomena are picked, the 
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work of reading other scientific narratives about it is being started, theoretical works that may 
help are being consulted and questions are honed. Then there is the data production or field 
phase, and then there is the writing phase. Each of these phases requires situating. In the pre-
field phase, situatedness means thinking through why I have chosen this phenomenon instead 
of that, this theory instead of that, this field instead of that. Let’s call this autobiographical 
situatedness. The next phase is the field phase itself, where situatedness turns on awareness 
about what is going on. How does my social characteristics, body language and attire shape 
the interaction and so the production of data? We call this field situatedness. Here, the ‘field’ 
refers to our interactions with actual persons in field sites and during interviews, as well as 
interactions with data such as documents and statistics (Jackson 2010). The field is also where 
our preparatory and ongoing work with autobiographical situatedness comes into play. Then 
there is the writing phase, which offer questions of an ethical nature – are there data that 
should be left out because leaving them in may have detrimental effects on other people? How 
should I flag my own status as data producer? We call this textual situatedness. 
 
Thinking about situatedness has a long pedigree. At ritual sites in ancient Greece, we find 
exhortations for people to know themselves. These exhortations may be read in many ways, 
one of which is that you need to know yourself in order to understand what others are doing. 
We are talking about an exhortation to situate yourself here. David Hume famously noted that 
self-reflectiveness lends a quality to social life that makes it into a separate sphere. One 
implication, highlighted by Dilthey a long century later, is that human sciences are 
qualitatively different from natural sciences, and so need other methodologies and methods. 
The philosophical literature on these matters is huge, as are the social science shelves on the 
ontological and epistemic implications thereof. If we turn to the specific question of method, 
however, only three literatures stand out. Two of these are well known and have followers in 
International Relations (IR); these are feminism and poststructuralism. A third and older 
literature, is the Gestalt tradition, which has its philosophical origins in phenomenology. 
 
We would argue that, while all three literatures at least implicitly address the question of 
situatedness as it pertains to all three phases of the research process, the main thrust of each 
tradition may be located within one of the phases. The feminist literature, be that standpoint or 
constructivist, has first and foremost pinpointed the pre-field phase and addressed the 
relevance of autobiographical situatedness. The Gestalt tradition started by looking at the 
psychological and psychological preconditions for cognition, which pertain to all three phases 
of the research process, but then came to specialize in interaction and field situatedness.
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Poststructuralism has focused mostly on the process of writing and textual situatedness. Given 
this situation, we  find it useful to lay out the major methodic challenges that pertain to each 
phase by using each of these three literatures as a guide. We will privilege the Gestalt 
tradition, since it  is less known and more in need of introduction and potentially more useful 
due to its newness in IR than the other two, but also because the field phase that it targets is 
perhaps the least elaborated in terms of method.  
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 Ash (1998) argues that the main reason for this was indeed their changed situatedness as they emigrated from a 
German academia mainly intent on philosophising about human being in the world into an American academia 
mainly preoccupied with getting the job of explaining human behavior done.   
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Autobiographical situatedness 
 
Langless and Frank (1981: 89-90) begin their treatment of autobiographies by stating that  
 
autobiographies are reports by individuals about their own lives; what distinguishes 
them from biography is that the author and subject are one and the same person. The 
authors of autobiographies typically narrate those events that went into making them 
unique persons. [...] presumably, these are events that strongly affected the author’s 
sense of self because, as one critic suggests, the author of an autobiography would 
have no reason to write one unless some sort of inner transformation had occured. […] 
an autobiography is, by definition, an account that focusses on the inner life (Langless 
& Frank 1981: 90; see also Starobinski 1971).  
 
Autobiography is about memory. Memories are social. We are thrown into the world and stuff 
happens: 
 
Although everybody started his life by inserting himself into the human world through 
action and speech, nobody is the author or producer of his own life story. In other 
words, the stories, the results of action and speech, reveal an agent, but this agent is 
not an author or producer. Somebody began it and is its subject in the twofold sense of 
the word, namely, its actor and sufferer, but nobody is its author (Arendt 1958: 184).  
 
To say that memories are social is to say that they are malleable over time. Memories are the 
result of communicative social processes, and not closed psychological time capsules. They 
are constituted by aesthetical frameworks and narrative tropes (White 2006, Bleiker 2001). 
How these frameworks differ from culture to culture is relevant when we aim at situating 
ourselves in research, for the phenomenon of not being able to guess how one’s interlocutors 
think about oneself is reinforced by cultural distance. Memories may also be suppressed, and 
so outside the immediate catchment area for situatedness. Autobiography is, therefore, an 
unreliable genre. ‘Time is foreshortened, details selected and highlighted, action concentrated, 
relations simplified’, historian David Lowenthal (1985: 216) writes in his widely read book 
The Past Is Another Country. 
 
Since the 1970s, feminist epistemology has worked on the importance of memory and the 
social situatedness that give rise to memory for scientific endeavour.
4
 A sprightly set of 
exercises like these are to be found in a recent volume edited by Naeem Inayatullah (2011). 
                                                          
4
 'It is the recognition of the situatedness of the knowledge production that has been key to the continual 
modification of [feminist] methodology’ (Skeggs 2008: 678). 
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The usual starting point is a reflexive one, namely that social phenomena hail from structures. 
Structures cannot be observed directly, but can only be induced by tracing back from the 
effects of the postulated structures. Humans are amongst the phenomena produced by 
structure. Researchers are human. If, then, the researcher observes her memories of becoming 
who she is as effects of social structure, then she may tell us something about structure. 
Harding argued that there is a job to be done here that had not been done before:  
 
In an important sense, our cultures have agendas and make assumptions that we as 
individuals cannot easily detect. Theoretically unmediated experience, that aspect 
of a group´s or an individual´s experience in which cultural influences cannot be 
detected, functions as a part of the evidence for scientific claims. [...] If the goal is 
to make available for critical scrutiny all the evidence marshalled for or against a 
scientific hypothesis, then this evidence too requires critical examination within 
scientific research processes. In other words, we can think of strong objectivity as 
extending the notion of scientific research to include systematic examination of 
such powerful background beliefs (Harding 1991: 150). 
 
Harding argues that the situated researcher does not produce relativistic knowledge. 
According to Harding, it is the sociological aspect of the knowledge production that is 
relativistic -- our assumptions of a specific topic and our specific gaze, the relational gathering 
and analyses of data -- but the knowledge produced may have the quality of what she calls 
string objectivity if the research process and its presumptions are clearly accounted for. While 
this point has a direct bearing on the need for autobiographical situatedness, the general point 
pertains to all humans, and so to researcher and interlocutors alike. Harding continues: 
 
To enact or operationalize the directive of strong objectivity, is to value the 
Other´s perspective and to pass over in thought into the social condition that 
creates it – not in order to stay there, to ‘go native’ or merge the self with the 
Other, but in order to look back at the self in all its cultural particularity from a 
more distant, critical, objectifying location. [...] Strong objectivity requires that we 
investigate the relation between subject and object rather than deny the existence 
of, or seek unilateral control over, this relation (Harding 1991: 151-152, see also 
Smith 1974, Haraway 1988, Harding 1993, Pohlhaus 2012:716).  
 
Regarding the aspect of memory work that concerns autobiographical situating, it is not the 
production of memories itself that is of interest, but how those memories are a precondition 
for the researcher’s choice of research question and theoretical approach (as well as her 
behaviour during the data collection process, a question to which we will return). If the choice 
of phenomenon is how Roma were exterminated in Nazi concentration camps, it is directly 
relevant to ask oneself why this choice has been made. Is it because of some ethnic or social 
attachment to the Roma? If so, the upmost autobiographical question is distance to group 
attachment, and the memories to concentrate on are those that pertain to these aspects of one’s 
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own identity. Is it because the many other stories, such as the state of Israel’s stories about the 
Jewish holocaust, have repressed it? If so, the upmost autobiographical question becomes 
questions of subalternness and fairness, and the key autobiographical question is what it is 
about one’s socialization (a Scandinavian inclusive national culture? A Christian 
universalistic upbringing?) that has inculcated such a way of looking at the world. Or is the 
choice due to a childhood fascination with travellers? If so, autobiographical situatedness may 
be a potential source of romanticizing bias in the field. We have here three very different 
ways into the field of research, and these ways will shape the research process. A reader 
alerted to autobiographical situatedness would ask at this point exactly why we choose Roma 
as an example. Well, one of us (Cecilie) has a Roma great grandfather (and was asked to leave 
a Cyprus sunglasses shop after having been asked if she was from Hungary only earlier this 
year; it turned out that there was a Roma village only three kilometers away). 
 
Autobiographical situatedness also pertains to choice of theories.
 5
 One frequently hears 
researchers say that they choose their theories out of ‘personal preference’ or ‘pragmatic 
reasons’. That is fair enough as far as it goes, but that is not very far. Social scientists are 
supposed to specialize in explaining a social fact, such as the choice by one human of one 
theory, in terms of other social facts, such as socialization. The point here is not that 
socialization determines choice direct. There is most often, maybe always, more than one 
reason for action. Socialization is, however, quite often one of them. One of us is a 
Foucauldian. Might that be due to autobiography? I (Iver) grew up with in-house nurses.
 
From 
the ripe age of three and a half to four, I had one who used me as a sexual plaything, putting 
my little arms to intimate use. In order to keep me from telling my parents, she would wave 
needles in front of my eyes and let me suck her breasts. I still cannot stand the idea of 
substituting my glasses for contacts. There is no doubt in my mind that I took to Foucault like 
a duck takes to water because there was something immediately familiar about a relational 
understanding of power that stressed  micro-practices being inscribed on the body, the 
production of docile bodies and the participation of the subaltern party in his own subjection.
6
 
For psychological reasons, my gaze was training towards the kind of situation he was talking 
about, and so I recognised his perspective on the world as akin to my own. Colleagues have 
sometimes wondered out loud how a white upper-middle class male who is leading a fairly 
regular family life ended up as a Foucauldian. I don’t. 
 
Field situatedness 
 
The early Gestalt theorists were trained in both experimental psychology and philosophy, and 
their philosophical godfather was phenomenologist Edmund Husserl. They were interested in 
ways of seeing, and their great discovery was that humans see wholeness where what is 
physically present to see is actually fragments. One of the reasons why data are constructed 
and not collected is that seeing and also sensing in general is an active and creative activity 
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6
 Intellectual lives are by definition shaped by reading experiences. For a lively discussion of this, see Szakolcsai 
1998. 
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that does not record, but actually produces, phenomena. Since these wholenesses or gestalts 
are actively produced by individuals as a result not only out of a psychological need to 
categorize the world, but also out of specific social experiences that help determine which 
categories  are actually being used, Gestalt psychologists have specialized in situatedness ever 
since (Ash 1997). As elaborated by the Gestalt psychologist Gordon Wheeler (1998: 28): 
 
For example, take the figure of, say, a haystack, within or against the gestalt or map of 
the ‘war landscape’. According to the subject´s goals of the moment - survival, 
conquest, escape, reconnaissance, forage, rest and so forth - the same haystack may be 
perceived as threat or shelter, protection or obstacle. And more than this: its value and 
even identity will be perceived differently, according to where and how it lies in 
relation to other perceived objects on the ‘map’ – lines of sight, battle lines, distance 
and access, and so on. Thus perceived and located (and thus by definition 
evaluated/categorized) the haystack becomes part of the changed and organized 
ground, or map, in relation to which new figures may then arise. 
 
The field sets the scene for our active cognition; we pick out and foreground what the gestalt 
tradition refers to as a figure, while the rest becomes (back)ground. The flavor of this kind of 
theorizing that highlights the psychological aspect should be clear already from a short précis 
of the experiments that moved the Gestalt tradition away from looking at perception of 
specific phenomena in laboratories and onto looking at behaviour in general. 
 
Around the time of the First World War, Wolfgang Köhler ran the world’s first test station for 
research on hominidae apes in Tenerife. The topic was learning and the most important 
finding for us was that learning often happens instantaneously, as epiphanies or aha moments. 
For example, Köhler placed several objects inside the cage that could be useful tools if 
combined correctly. These could be crates that had to be stacked on top of one other to reach a 
banana dangling from the ceiling, or sticks that needed assembling so that the the banana 
outside the bars could be reached. The apes became incredibly frustrated by these exercises, 
and reacted by roaming around the cage and destroying the objects - their potential tools - 
against the walls and bars. The point was, however, that when learning took place, it 
happened in a flash.  All of a sudden things added up, and new possibilities for action 
appeared. The most illustrative example Köhler gives was his trying to make the apes learn to 
go around a glass wall in order to reach the food on the other side. After a whole lot of 
bluster, the most gifted ape suddenly understood how it worked, and went off around the glass 
wall and smack into the trough. Köhler then placed his two-year-old daughter in the cage. 
After a short while the trick dawned on her, too, and she was around the glass wall and into 
the bowl in one fell swoop. (Köhler’s dog was rather less fortunate. He could smell the food 
through the glass wall,with the result that it was glued to the glass wall, paralyzed by his own 
acute sense of smell). The point is the sudden insights of apes and children, and the seamless 
movement in which understanding resulted. Both these phenomena – the learning and action – 
are characterized by their irreducible wholeness. The different parts become a whole, and the 
whole is more than the sum of the different parts. One may attempt to break down the smooth 
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movement around the glass wall into different motoric factors – one leg in front of the other, 
the torso leaning forward, the hand around the wall, etc. – but this would simply miss the 
point, which is that the resulting action must be understood as a whole greater than the sum of 
its parts. It may, in other words, be understood as a Gestalt. Köhler, therefore, posited that he 
could prove that not only perceptions but also learning and action were characterized by 
Gestalts, and that the principles of forming Gestalts applied not only to humans, but was a 
potential inherent in the mammal brain (Lakoff and Johnsen 1999). 
 
This may seem far removed from social scientific research practice and the question of 
situatedness. It is not. The researcher will tend to grasp insights as wholenesses, and she will 
grasp them by means of categories that are part of her software. Let us give two examples of 
how this works. 
 
Although I (Cecilie) had been interested in the effects and workings of class for many years, I 
had yet to research class myself when I started my Ph.D, and I had no clear idea of how to do 
it. During my fieldwork I sat in a waiting room in a health visiting center in the eastern part of 
Oslo observing the interactions between parents and their children. The atmosphere in the 
waiting room was quiet, even anxious, and there was little interaction between parents and 
children. As I pondered the meaning of this, a mother and her two children entered the room. 
The mother was very well yet discreetly dressed in good-quality clothes and jewelry. She sat 
down to talk and play with her children, and when the health visitor came to fetch her, she did 
not hear the call. This mother stood out in sharp contrast to the other parents and made me 
suddenly realize, Köhler’s ape-style, how I could study class. I recognized this mother’s 
being-in-the-world as akin to my own. The reason why I experienced the other mothers and 
their practices – their dress, their on-parade comportment, their silence, their anxiety in front 
of the health visitors – as strange, was simply a class thing. They were overwhelmed by the 
middle class knowledge of the health visitor. The talkative mother and I were not, for we, too, 
were possessors of (other kinds of) middle-class knowledge. By implication, one way to study 
class would be to observe closely what kind of effects my interlocutors have on me, and to 
use these observations as analytical entries. Here we have a concrete example of how 
awareness of one’s own situatedness (in casu, class) is analytically helpful when we want to 
understand the workings of hierarchies and marginalization in empirical studies. In the case of 
health visitors, the researcher’s self-awareness on class and gender gave an analytical entry to 
see how marginalization of class and gender is shaped and co-constituted by specific welfare 
agents whose job it is to do the opposite; to secure equality (Neumann 2012: 149; see also 
Skeggs 2002 on working class women and care work and how they are positioned towards the 
state as marginalized guarantors of welfare politics). 
 
To complement with an example from IR, my (Iver's) supervisor, John Vincent, once told me 
how he had set out to write his own doctorate on when military intervention would be 
warranted. He could not get it to come together. One day he suddenly realised that he himself 
was against intervention on principle. He threw out what he had, recast the thesis as a history 
of the principle of non-intervention, and finished the thing in a year. 
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Here we have another reason why autobiographical situating is such an important preparatory 
exercise in the pre-field stage: it preps you on your own categories and so increases the 
possibility of staying aware of exactly how you single out this rather than that phenomenon 
for data production out of the never-ending flow of phenomena that surrounds you while in 
the field. This is how the work on autobiographical situatedness comes into play in the field 
and so becomes a part of field situatedness. Becoming aware of the self and of what happens 
with you when you relate to the other(s) in the field may be highly analytically rewarding. 
Being aware of how I (Cecilie) categorize others (persons or texts) with regard to class ( or 
gender, or ethnicity, or…) may open up possibilities for analysing power that I had not 
thought of before I entered the field. For me this is an emotional path that follows from 
experiences of anxiety, uneasiness, or restlessness, that used to result in a lot of questions (see 
also Dauphinee 2013).
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Finally, the epiphany-like way in which wholenesses come together should be a consolation 
to the field-working researcher. Field work typically involves a lot of seemingly false starts 
and a lot of frustrations. There are periods where we, usualty falsely, feel that nothing 
happens. If, however, the researcher has done her pre-field job and read up on as many 
aspects of the phenomenon to be studied as possible, then chances are good that things will 
suddenly fall into place. When Nietzsche exhorted us to perspectivise a phenomenon and 
when Geertz told us to provide a thick description of it, it was exactly because the more 
angles we have on a phenomenon and the more disjointed stuff we know about it, the better 
the ground, and the better the ground, the better the chances tha ta fifure will emerge. The 
way to insight into wholeness goes via the scrutiny of parts. Every little thing may prove to be 
one of the triggers for the Gestalt to emerge.’ 
 
The Gestalt tradition also offers another methodic tool that may help researchers situate while 
in the field, namely the so-called contact mechanisms. Contact patterns indicate the ways 
humans interact and otherwise relate to one another in general, and are not terms that fix a 
person according to a certain personality characterisation (Clarkson and Mackewn 1992). 
They are, rather, modes of interaction that may be prevalent for certain people, in certain 
situations, such as an interview of/or? a casual chat with an informant. Since they all crop up 
in informants, it may be good to be aware of all six -- projection, introjection, retroflection, 
deflection, confluence, egotism. Since confluence and projection are the most usual ones, 
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 In a research project on social workers in a home based residential care for children, my analytical entry to 
understand the social workers professional ethics went through reflections on my own experiences with 
motherhood. I would insist that my children do their homework instead of watching TV for hours. How could I 
make sense of their particular ways of acceptance, ways of setting limits, of service and care compared to what 
parents do in what we like to think of as “normal” families?). This in turn led me to investigate the impact of the 
institutional conditions on the social workers, and how this particular institution was situated in and affected by 
the larger child welfare machinery in Norway (Neumann 2010, see also Dorothy Smith 2005 on institutional 
ethnography). 
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however, we will use those as examples and relate them to the researcher, as opposed to her 
interlocutors.
8
 
 
Confluence refers to a way of being with others that is characterised by an inclination to agree 
with the ones we are spending time with. It reflects an underlying desire to make things 
“flow”, to find things and ways of being we can agree on, be those perspectives (an economic 
gaze), identities (we are both fathers), political viewpoints (there is no such thing as a 
combatant child). Without the ability and desire to create confluence, there would be a great 
deal more conflict in human interactions and communications. Confluent persons wish to 
maintain that blurriness when interacting and communicating with others, because it prevents 
conflict and disagreements. If you have a tendency towards confluence it is probably easy for 
you to make people talk during interviews. You will try to create a nice and disarming contact 
between yourself and the interlocutor, for this is what you normally do. You are likely to be 
good at listening and giving encouraging signals which invite the interlocutor to talk. The 
challenge to those inclined to confluence would be how to ask follow-up questions of a 
confronting or potentially distressing nature. Fear of breaking the confluence and the friendly 
atmosphere may lead to the researcher avoiding questions about things that should clearly 
have been asked about. Fear that the interlocutor will perceive such questions as annoying or 
hurtful will come in the way of data creation. Woody Allen’s persona Zelig, from the 
eponymously named film, is the ultimate in confluence; he literally becomes the person he is 
speaking to.  
 
I (Cecile) have a tendency towards confluence. The need for seamless and friction-free 
communication is more intense when I feel insecure, as I often do in the beginning of 
interviews. This is particularly amplified when I research other well behaved, conscientious 
upper middle class women. To be aware of this does not mean that I try to be less nice than I 
usually am, but I do carry with me a pre-written list of critical questions in order to make sure 
that I own up and actually ask them. This is a technique I use in order to be certain that my 
need for confluence does not get to command the interview completely.  
 
If confluence is about over-identifying with the interlocutor, then projection is about me 
perceiving what you say and do according to specific expectations I have attached to you, and 
which do not have anything to do with who you are. If, for example, you remind me of  my 
mother I will perceive what you say and do as a continuation of my expectations of her, not of 
                                                          
8
 Egotism is the opposite contact mechanisms of confluence. Persons characterised by an egotistic contact pattern 
will not be particularly interested in what others think or feel, but is instead intended on voicing his concerns, 
and his own opinions. He causes a lot of conflict and disagreement all around, but does not quite care. The 
person controlled by introjection searches for critical signals from others indicating that he should improve or do 
better. He often accepts the blame, without considering that others might be to blame. The one retroflecting does 
to others what he wants them to do to him. If I like to be supervised in a certain way, I will assume that my 
students also prefer to receive the same type of supervision. The one who is deflecting, finally, seeks a form of 
isolation, and will in given situations try to pretend the social world does not exist. In situations she perceives as 
uncomfortable, for example, she will look the other way. When you ask her opinion it becomes apparent that she 
has not heard a word of what has been said or done.  
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you. We all project, all the time, and it is necessary in order to try to understand how others 
experience the world. This is the basis of inter-subjectivity; I experience the world like this 
and therefore assume that you experience it more or less similarly. We assume that we share 
something, and then we go about finding out (Frykman and Løfgren 2003).This has also been 
a concern among feminists. Drawing on Harding and others, Ruane (2013: 53) puts it very 
well: 
 
As feminist standpoint research suggests, all perspectives are partial and rooted in 
particular experience […]. This can significantly limit efforts at inclusion, not because 
of bad faith, but because of lack of imagination or an inability to relate. Iris Marion 
Young (1994) argues that we may never be able to ‘walk in someone else´s shoes’; but 
instead, may only project our experience onto others in frequently inappropriate ways. 
 
In other words, to project is also an attempt to include the other and to try to imagine what it 
is like to be him or her. If projection is a very active contact mechanism, however, it may lead 
to over-interpretation of others in your image. You see them as you see yourself, and a 
neurotic consequence that many of us may recognise is that you accuse them of things that 
you do or feel yourself but will not recognize. If I am irritable I accuse you of being irritable, 
and I will have a tendency to deny my own irritability if you correct me on my interpretation 
of you. If I understand academic achievement to be the most valuable of possible professional 
achievements, I will assume you do the same (and I will be surprised or even confused if this 
is not the case).     
 
I (Iver) am impatient and have a tendency to project. During interviews or in the field, this 
means that I am at risk of not paying attention to things people say that do not fit with my 
generalised expectations. For example, Cecilie and I conducted an interview with two female 
diplomats on their experiences with being women in a male dominated sphere back in the 
1970s. After the interview, that we tape-recorded, my impression of what they had shared was 
that it was of little value to my gender research interest. However, when we transcribed the 
interview it turned out that they had said a lot of interesting things. What seemed to have 
happened was that they had shared their gendered experiences in relation to a number of 
seemingly unimportant events, and that they talked about this in a manner that I found to be 
chatty. What I had projected onto them was a certain state of knowledge and analytical clarity 
on the subject that they did not feel like giving it, at least not then and there. If the interview 
had not been transcribed, I would have missed valuable information because of my tendency 
to project.    
 
 
When people interrupt me or do not listen, my impulse is to stop talking. Like most alert 
children, I had my fill of that back then, but the key thing here is, I think, that I spent the 
better part of seven years (1989-1996) trying to introduce poststructuralism to Norwegian 
political science. Apart from the occasional furious attack, there was no reaction beyond a 
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steady insistence that this had nothing to do with science. When I gather data and am 
stonewalled, an experience that all field-working IR researchers will sooner or later come 
across, my impulse is to walk away. That impulse has to be lived down, for no interaction 
spells no data. So I think to myself ‘you little ignoramus’ and change the tack of my 
questions. 
 
Textual situatedness 
 
We have discussed situatedness pre-field. We have discussed situatedness in-field. Then there 
is situatedness post-field. We both remember our flabbergasted student reactions to some of 
our own professors when they said we should ‘just write up the material’. There is no ‘just’ 
about it. It is demanding and exhausting work. Stuff must come together. And then there is the 
question of situatedness – how are the researcher and her interlocutors positioned in the text?  
 
Textual situatedness includes the task of deciding what responsibilities the researcher has 
towards her informants when it comes to honouring promises about anonymity and non-
publication of certain data and making certain that informants will not suffer legal or political 
prosecution as a result of your publications. Then there is the question of revenge. As we 
noted when discussing projection above, a researcher usually stacks up a good deal of 
frustration with informants during field work (see also Sontag 1994, Hartman 2007). The text 
is not the place to take out that frustration direct. If the experience is put to use, it must be 
done in such a way that the interlocutors are not hung out to dry, This responsibility rests 
firmly with the author.  
 
Researchers also have a responsibility of seeing to it that they themselves do not come into 
harm’s way, if nothing else then to make the research available. A particularly pertinent 
example of the latter problematique concerns IR scholars who do work in conflict zones. The 
United States operates with a so-called terror list, with organizations that are considered to be 
orchestrating terroristic acts. Any contact with such organizations, say research into their 
representation of the conflict they are involved in or training in peaceful techniques of conflict 
resolution, is illegal, and, if discovered, automatically leads to the opening of a criminal 
investigation. Any researcher working with this kind of material should keep this kind of 
censorship in mind when authoring texts, so that prosecution of her research and indeed of her 
may be avoided. This brings up the matter of expediency: There are situations when you do 
not have to, indeed ought not to, tell how the data have been produced. 
 
The question of how to situate oneself in relation to the implied reader comes to the fore when 
the issue is how to translate a text. A text is a piece of language that does work in a social 
context, so a translation is by definition not only a displacement of language, but also a 
displacement of audience. Horses for courses means that changes are called for. It is 
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illuminating to consider how the positivist translator into English of a minor classic on the 
Carolingean empire in German situates himself: 
 
The present book has aroused a certain amount of criticism in German scholarly circles 
because it is customary for German historians not only to be concerned with the disinterested 
search for historical truth, but also to regard themselves as the guardians of the 'greatness' of 
the historical past. The English scholar, working in a community whose national life has been 
less frustrated than that of Germany, is less jealous of guarding the elements of so-called 
greatness in the history of England; but when rading this book he ought to remember that the 
author, writing initially for a German public, has, at times, been forced to adopt an apologetic 
tone when he has been most critical of Charles's achievements. To a rerading public 
accustumed to the tradition of English scholarship, there is less need for the author's 
insistence that in spite of his obvious shortcomings, Charles ought to be considered great, than 
there is to a German public (Munz 1978: xxiii). 
 
The aspect of textual situatedness that has been most elaborated over the last half century is, 
however, the question of who the ‘I’ that writes is, and how that ‘I’ is manifested in the text. 
The first seeds were sown in the late 1960s, when poststructuralists like Roland Barthes and 
Michel Foucault problematized the death of the author.
9
 Poststructural anthropologists 
followed up in the 1970s by asking who produced anthropological data. The key work here is 
Paul Rabinow’s Reflections on Field Work in Morocco ([1977] 2007), where there are very 
few Moroccans, but ample doses of Rabinow. The poststructural anthropological milieu 
around Rice University tied these autobiographical concerns firmly to textual situatedness and 
produced a string of works on the matter, the locus classicus being James Clifford and George 
Marcus’s Writing Culture (1986). As pioneer political scientist Michael Shapiro formulated 
the main issue at stake around the same time, 
 
Here is the epistemological rub: the idea that lives are ‘represented’ by an obtrusive, 
scientifically oriented form of discourse. With this idea, central to a bankrupt version 
of empiricism, comes a failure to appreciate that biographers are writers who 
participate in representational practices, and that their texts impose meaning on lives. 
When one recognizes the existence of these practices, the knowledge problematic 
shifts from the accumulation of so-called facts about a life to the writing itself 
(Shapiro 1988: 72).
10
 
 
There is an intersubjective element in textual situatedness. Every writer has one or more 
implied readers or imagined personae that they expect will read the text. These readers will 
not coincide with actual readers, for who knows by whom and in which contexts a given text 
                                                          
9
 The key philosophical source on which they drew was Martin Heidegger, as did Hanna Arendt in the quote on 
thrownness given above. 
10
 Note the epistemological focus; as did feminists, poststructuralists tended to highlight epistemological and 
methodological concerns, to the detriment of the perhaps more mundane challenges of method.  
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will be read. Still, the more one thinks through who the implied readers may be, the better one 
situates the text for the implied reader. If you write about Brazil in Brazilian, lots of stuff may 
be taken for granted. When the same material is to be pitched to an English-speaking 
audience, however, more general contextualisation is needed. Such situating is not explicitly 
visible in the text, as the operation rests with the disposition of the text, yet it is still very 
much an example of textual situatedness, targeting the future.
11
 
 
This was much on my (Iver’s) mind when I wrote my second doctoral thesis, on diplomats. 
Ian Hacking has discussed how ontological, epistemological and methodological concerns 
colour what he calls our styles of reasoning (Hacking, 2002: 4). My problem was that I came 
to anthropology as from political science and IR, and political scientists and IR scholars have 
rather different concerns than political science. Political science is primarily preoccupied with 
effects or results of political games. Typical research questions concern who win and who 
lose in decision making processes, and why. Anthropology, on the other hand, is more 
interested in how societies are constituted. Although it was surprisingly hard to kick old 
habits, the major challenge was not one of ‘style of reasoning’, as specified by Hacking, but 
rather of style of writing (see Derrida 1985). To write anthropology is very different from 
writing political science. Karsten, one of my political science students, told me some years 
back that his first political science professor had written the following advice on the 
blackboard: “write boringly”. The idea was that you should write from an objective point of 
view, about objective things, in an objective way. The form of presentation is thereby 
coloured by the fact that you pretend to take up a view from nowhere. Such a way of writing 
has little space for active verb forms and pronouns such as “I”, “you” and “me”, and is more 
inclined to passive verb forms, “we” and “one”. The “view from nowhere” is the antithesis of 
the situated view. For the anthropologist, it is also an impossibility (see for example Ardener 
1989: 213-214). Anthropologists have a running debate on situatedness (a particularly 
commendable volume is Okely & Callaway 2002). The textual situatedness of interlocutors is 
informed by the adage ‘show it, don’t say it’, which takes some doing to learn and learning to 
do, even for those, like myself, who had already paid heed to these things for decades. There 
are considerable differences in national academic tradition that may exacerbate these 
problems. In British academic texts one may simply imply a theoretical concept (as we have 
implied the phenomenological concept of thrownness in this text), and in a French academic 
text, anything more than an allusion might lay you wide open to charges of being banal and 
obvious. In the American tradition, on the other hand, it seems that everything is supposed to 
be spelled out at great length. An American mainstream political scientist with the unlikely 
wish to pick up an extra competence in anthropology would probably be doubly 
(disciplinarily and nationally) challenged. 
 
Two ways of going about situatedness 
 
                                                          
11
 It is also a good example of what phenomenologists talk about when they insist that any action is informed by 
the past, which delivers the horizon of the action; the present, when it takes place; and the future, when the 
expected effects of the action will play (or will not) be played out (Sokolowski 2000). 
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The point of departure was that data production is intersubjective. We also stressed how it is 
necessarily the researcher who is in charge of the research process, for she is the one with the 
fullest information on where it is going, for the very simple reason that it happens in her. This 
means that the researcher make things (among them, texts) happen that would not otherwise 
have happened. In other words, she is, ceteris paribus, at the empowered side of the power-
laden relation with her informants where scientific discourse is concerned.
12
 One response to 
this fact is to ask questions like ‘which are my responsibilities?’ ‘what happens to me as a 
human as I do this research’? ‘what happens to me as a researcher when I write this text?’ We 
have already touched on the scientific preconditions that inform such an approach, when we 
noted how feminists like Sandra Harding place what Jackson (2010) calls a reflexive 
ontological wager by positing that there are structures out there that spawn phenomena like 
humans. We may find out which these structures are by thinking of ourselves as effects of 
those structures. ‘[R]eflexivist scholars -- chief among them, feminists and critical theorists, 
including postcolonial scholars -- would say that knowledge of social arrangements begins not 
with the world, but with the self. Explicit, if necessarily incomplete, self-awareness marks the 
distinctive methodological strategy employed by reflexivist scholars’ (Jackson 2010: 159). 
 
The way to produce , that is, the method to use, is to trace changes in the self, be that by 
memory work or by tracing how research experiences change us pre-field, in-field and post-
field. In IR, we are blessed with an exemplary example of such work, in the shape of 
Elizabeth Dauphinée’s (2013) account of how research on the Bosnian War changed her 
entire way of thinking about research and of being a researcher, but also and crucially about 
Balkan wars in the 1990s and conflict in general. As to textual situatedness, she recounts how 
she tore up one manuscript because she found it to be inadequate in this regard, and wrote a 
book on how she was changed instead.
13
  
 
The reflexive wager is not the only kind of ontological wager that invites self-situatedness, 
however. There is more than one way to use the self in research, for there is more than one 
way of hooking up to the world and choose one’s criteria for proof and demonstration.14 One 
way is the reflexivist way just charted, which results in the method of tracing changes in your 
own sense of self as a tool for analytical entries and in order to induce structures.    
                                                          
12
 Unless the researcher interviews other and more senior researchers. If we include other discourses than the 
scientific one, this becomes an empirical question, where the situatedness of the specific informant (disaster 
victim? Aid worker? Prime minister of donor country?) as well as the character of the general context (colonial? 
Neo-colonial? War?) weigh in heavily. 
13
 While that new book was successful, we note that the procedure cannot be recommended across the board; the 
primary interest of social science remains the social patterns formed by the people we study, and not our own 
angst. Dauphineé would definitely not be a standpoint feminist in Harding’s sense, for there does not seem to be 
a ´strong objectivist´ programme of objectifying social positions as a scholar and a multiplexed positioned 
human being (class, race, gender, etc) here. Still, Dauphineé does come close to Harding (1991) and also 
Haraway (1988) in thinking about knowledge as partial and fragmented. In stepping down from the position as 
´knowledgeable researcher´ to the position as ´modest witness´ and in critically scrutinizing the clash between 
her own scholarly knowledge  and the voice of a war criminal, her project has some of the critical effects on the 
social order as well as on IR as scholarly discipline that Harding calls for. All share a reflexivist approach. 
14
 A number of texts on autobiography in IR, such as Brigg and Bleiker 2010 and Vrasti 2008, imply that 
reflexivity is the only scholarly way of situating oneself. This monological view is criticized not only by Jackson 
2010, but also by Racantore 2010 and Sande Lie 2011. 
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Another way is what Jackson (2010) calls the analyticist way. The analyticist, who may have 
various specific (and internally conflicting) theoretical attachments such as Weberian, 
pragmatic or Foucauldian ones, does not focus on herself in order to induce the nature of 
structures existing out there, such as patriarchy, for she believes that a timeless structure such 
as patriarchy simply do not exist. She instead focusses on coming to terms with herself as an 
instrument of data production relative to the social world, be that in terms of forging an ideal 
type based on a value judgment, in terms of why she thinks a certain phenomenon constitutes 
a problem or in other relevant ways. 
 
This difference speaks directly to poststructuralists like us, for poststructuralism is defined by 
its break with structuralism exactly over the ontological issue of whether structures exist 
independently of human action. Structuralists thought they did, which meant that research 
became a question of producing data about manifest structures, with the intention of 
identifying the latent structure that could not be observed directly, but that spawned and held 
together the manifest structures (Dosse 1997). The break with this way of thinking came when 
people like Foucault suggested that latent structures simply did not exist. Manifest structures 
were not anchored in anything, and they did not necessarily hang together. The entire reason 
why Foucault hatched concepts like episteme, discourse and dispositif was to find alternative 
ways of thinking about how phenomena like socially situated humans emerge. So, Foucault 
would agree with Harding or Dauphinée that humans are produced by the social. He went as 
far as defining critique as the art of not being governed so much, a statement that we think 
may be paraphrased to read that the work of situating yourself by intellectual means is a 
creative technique of the self. But Foucault would not agree that what produces selves is 
given beyond discourse. It follows that Foucault simply could not trust introspection to 
identify the structure that spawned him, for to Foucault, his own interpellation into or 
resistance to, not a structure in the singular, but to discourses in the plural, is co-constitutive 
of those discourses.  
 
Note that Foucault still definitely situates himself as a researcher, but his situatedness is of a 
different kind. As a young man, he experienced psychological turmoil (Eribon1992). He 
wrote about the birth of a clinic. His sexual orientation was sado-masochistic homosexuality 
(Miller 1993). He wrote about the history of sexuality. Nowhere, however, will one find 
Foucault using the reflexive methods of memory work or of introspection with a view to 
following changes in his own emergent self. Jackson (2010: X) sums up the difference as 
follows: 
 
An analyticist might articulate a value-commitment to beginning with everyday 
understandings and proceed to elaborate an ideal-typical model of everyday 
understanding […], but that would not make her work reflexivist because the warrant 
for her claims would not simply be the fact that they were connected to a social 
group’s common-sense practices but would instead be the fact that they were 
connected to an ideal-typical model rooted in a particular value-commitment. 
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In Foucault (e.g. 2011), this value-commitment is on behalf of himself and /or specific 
groups. He defined his work as critiques, and defined critique as the art of not being governed 
so much. Situatedness was about picking out some historical sequence where something that 
had before been considered doxic or normal, becomes problematized, with a view to 
understanding the consequence for some group of which the researcher may, or may not, be a 
member. The value commitment that situates the researcher is towards understanding what the 
effects of categorizing and representing things like this rather than that does to a certain group 
of people, such as 18
th
 century French hermaphrodites, 19
th
 century French murderers or 20
th
 
century French manic depressives. 
 
Ontological commitments have methodological consequences. The reflexive way of doing 
situating is to ask what latent structure and immediate context do to me as a researcher. 
Reflexivists often write as if they have a monopoly on situatedness. For example, in the fullest 
IR treatment of methodological (as opposed to methodic) autobiographical situatedness to 
date, Brigg and Bleiker (2010: 785) writes about one of us (Iver) that: 
 
Neumann uses his dual role of participant and researcher to scrutinize taken-for-
granted entities [within a Foreign Ministry], such as the individual or the state. 
Yet while Neumann draws directly on his personal experiences to offer valuable 
insights, he does not explore the methodological quandaries accompanying his 
research. We learn little, for instance, about how Neumann negotiated his position 
as both the subject and object of research, as both knower and part of the 
empirical world under investigation. Add to this that Neumann, as any other 
author, is not a stable and given ‘entity’, but a person whose sense of self and 
whose knowledge of the world is constantly reshaped by historical, cultural and 
political influences. How might we draw upon the self and evaluate the resulting 
research in such circumstances? 
 
I (Iver) have explored the methodological quandaries accompanying my research all right, but 
as a Foucauldian, I did not do that reflexively, but analytically. Ontological and 
methodological commitments have methodic consequences. An analyticist draws upon the 
self not by the method of introspection, as Brigg and Bleiker exhorted me to do in the passage 
just quoted, but by drawing on autobiography and situatedness in forming value 
commitments. Those value commitments spawn research questions, which inform data 
production or method.  
 
The key methodic consequence is that reflexivists and analyticists approach data production 
from opposite ends of the researcher/informant relationship. Where a reflexivist researcher 
tends to handle the relation between interlocutor and researcher by asking how interlocutors 
affect her, an analyticist researcher tends to ask how the researcher affects them. Where the 
reflexivist is primarily self-regarding, the analyticist is primarily other-regarding. For 
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example, in Dauphinée’s work, the accent is on how her main informant, Stojan Sokolovi´c, 
induced changes in her. Memory work is about how previous social settings affected the 
researcher’s former selves. By contrast, the reader will probably have noted already, and if not 
he will note it if he goes back and re-reads this text, that most of Iver’sexamples concern how 
the researcher affects the informants. The reason for this is not only ethical, but analytical. 
Our specific value commitments in a scientific undertaking are linked to our general value 
commitments, and those commitments define us as selves. They are inscribed in our bodies 
and shine through in the way we dress and the way we speak, as well as in our comportment. 
They are, therefore, not only eminently present when we produce data, but constitutive of 
those data. It stands to reason that an analyticist must monitor how he constitutes data. The 
focus is, consequently on how the other reacts to what we do, and not on how we react to 
what the other does. Put differently, if we draw on George Herbert Mead’s old distinction 
between the I (my experience of self) and the me (others’ experience of my self), then the 
reflexivist’s method fastens on following changes in the I, while the analyticist’s method 
fastens on following changes in the me. These are two different ways to skin a cat, two 
different uses of the self in research. To ask which is better is a moot question, for they are the 
result of different ontological wagers, and designed to do different research jobs. 
 
Any difference may be dedifferentiated. The reflectivist/analyticist distinction is no exception. 
We are particularly well placed to do this, since Cecilie is more of a reflexivist and Iver is 
more of an analyticist, which means that we have been quarreling about how to frame a 
number of examples given here throughout the gestation of this article.
15
 Note that Jackson's 
reflexivist has placed her ontological wager on there existing structures beyond the social. 
Note also that post-structuralism's break with structuralism fastened exactly on the ontic status 
of structure. Post-structuralists are post exactly because they did not place their ontological 
wager on the existence of latent structures. It followed that they could no longer hook up to 
the world by studying manifest structures that would lead them to latent ones, for what is the 
point of chasing something you have placed a wager on not being there in the first place. The 
solution for poststructuralists was to substitute other concepts, concepts that were explicitly 
social and malleable, for the asocial and deterministic concept of structure. The most well-
known of these is discourse (and here we have the reason why Foucault must be categorised 
as an analyticist within this particular scheme). For poststructuralists, subjects are produced 
by discourses, but discourses are not asocial and deterministic. On the contrary, they will by 
definition change over time. If we approach situatedness in this way, the methodic possibility 
opens up of combining the study of the I and the me, for the logic of discourses may be learnt, 
and relationist analysis accomplished. 
 
Conclusion 
 
                                                          
15
 In a similar vein, Hamati-Ataya (2012: 689, n. 4) notes how Colin Wight and Patrick Jackson find Bourdieu to 
be an analyticist and a refelxivist, respectively. To us, Bourdieu is a particularly good example of positivism 
gone mad: Bourdieu purports to ‘objectify’ himself in order to gain a privileged position ‘outside’ discourse 
from which he, Marxist style, may tell everybody else how they are ‘objectively’ situated in this or that fashion 
and cannot get out of it, only Bourdieu himself can, compare Mérand and Pouliot 2008. 
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The better work the researcher does on situating herself in relation to her field of study, the 
better the quality of the ensuing data. The better the data, the better the texts that constitute the 
result of the research. The methodology of situatedness is a crowded shelf. For this pragmatic 
reason, we have targeted not methodology, but method. We have stressed the importance of 
doing memory work in the pre-field phase and to keep on doing so in the field. Choice of 
field, choice of research question and choice of theories are often tied to autobiography. 
Cognition in the field happens as an active process, where our categories help us grasp 
wholenesses or gestalts of data. The better the researcher knows her categories and where they 
come from, the higher the awareness in the field, and the better the data produced. Insights 
into modes of cognition, such as confluence and projection, also help. During the writing 
phase, there are ethical question to consider when decisions are made about what to keep in 
and what to leave out, and there is the question of how the presence of the researcher should 
be presented. Should she follow James Joyce’s adage and be in her text as God in creation, 
namely hidden, should she give a succinct presentation about the whys and hows of research 
choices in the preface, or should she mark a running presence throughout the text?  
 
The most important answer to this question is to find in what kind of ontological 
commitments the researcher brings to the writing. If the researcher thinks of method as a 
question of producing data about how she is a product of a structure, then the thing to do is to 
trace how the research change her self, for these changes are effects of structure, and so a 
study of them will tell us something about that structure. Situating oneself becomes a question 
of discussing how interlocutors and research context change the researcher’s self. If, on the 
other hand, the researcher thinks of method as a question of producing data by bringing 
certain value commitments with her into the field, ask questions based on those value 
commitments and produce data out of the resulting answers, then that is a question of tracing 
how the self effects changes in the informants. The relationship between researcher and 
informant is approached from the other end.  
 
Analytically, then, there are at least two basic ways of using the researcher self when going 
about the work of situating oneself in relation to the research process. The data-producing 
techniques that we have discussed here should come in handy for both approaches, and both 
approaches seem to share a very old professional ethos: researcher, know thyself.  
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